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north america
family faceS criminal chargeS for 
human trafficKing in canada
In what has been called Canada’s largest 
human trafficking case to date, Ferenc 
Domotor Sr. is accused of being the ring-
leader in a human trafficking and fraud 
operation in the City of Hamilton, Ontario, 
Canada. Domotor Sr. is currently facing 
human trafficking, fraud, conspiracy and 
organized crime charges before the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. Along with mul-
tiple alleged co-conspirators, Domotor Sr. 
is accused of luring 19 Hungarian nationals 
to Canada with the promise of high-paying 
jobs. Instead, when they arrived they were 
allegedly forced to work as slave laborers 
for Domotor Sr.'s family-run stucco and 
construction business. The Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) arrested 
ten members of Domotor Sr.’s extended 
family on charges of unlawful recruitment 
and exploitation of foreign nationals, and 
of withholding travel documents. Charges 
were also filed against other members of 
Domotor Sr.’s family for receiving finan-
cial benefit from the exploitation of the 
Hungarian workers by collecting the work-
ers’ welfare payments.
Allegedly, Domotor Sr. financed and 
arranged for the victims to fly to Canada, 
and instructed them to claim refugee status 
upon arrival. Domotor Sr. then locked them 
in the basements of homes in Hamilton and 
Ancaster, Ontario where some were fed 
“three-day-old meals that even dogs would 
not eat.” Domotor Sr. then allegedly con-
fiscated their passports and forced them 
to work at a construction site for seven 
days a week without pay. Several victims 
claim that they were threatened, ordered 
not to leave the houses unaccompanied, 
and beaten.
Canada has only recently adopted mea-
sures to aid trafficking victims and pros-
ecute traffickers. Trafficking in persons did 
not become an offense under the Criminal 
Code until November 2005 due to a lack of 
widespread awareness about the extent of 
the problem and insufficient prioritization 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
of the issue in the political sphere. Before 
this amendment, the Criminal Code did 
not contain any provisions that specifically 
forbade trafficking in persons, although 
several other offenses such as, kidnap-
ping, uttering threats, and extortion were 
used to prosecute human traffickers. So 
far, however, convictions under the new 
law have occurred only in cases involving 
Canadian women and girls subjected to 
sexual exploitation. 
The prosecution of Domotor Sr. marks 
the first case of forced labor not involv-
ing sexual exploitation that will be tried 
under the law. The prosecution of Domotor 
Sr. is also significant because the victims 
were foreign nationals – a move that may 
indicate Canada’s new willingness to pros-
ecute cases involving foreigners rather than 
limiting prosecution to cases where victims 
are Canadian citizens. This case also high-
lights what immigration agency records 
have suggested: more human trafficking 
victims in Canada are forced into manual 
labor than are forced into sex trafficking.
In the past decade, Canada has taken 
significant steps toward addressing human 
trafficking. On October 21, 2010, the 
Canadian federal government introduced 
the Preventing Human Smugglers from 
Abusing Canada’s Immigration System 
Act. This legislation proposes extensive 
measures to stop human trafficking by mak-
ing it easier to prosecute human traffickers, 
imposing mandatory prison sentences on 
convicted human smugglers, and holding 
ship owners and operators accountable 
for use of their ships in human smuggling 
operations. Additionally, in 2002 Canada 
ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supple-
menting the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime 
(the Protocol). Canada made no reserva-
tions or declarations and thus is obligated 
to uphold all parts of the Protocol. Canada’s 
legal obligations under the treaty include 
enacting legislative measures to establish 
criminal offenses for trafficking, taking 
measures to provide trafficking victims 
with social and psychological services, 
and taking steps to prevent human traffick-
ing. Since May 2006, Canada has started 
to provide foreign victims of human traf-
ficking with temporary residence permits 
and access to interim healthcare coverage. 
Subsequent legislation gave victims the 
ability to obtain a work permit.
The successful prosecution of Domotor 
Sr. would mark a major step forward for 
Canada in combating human trafficking. 
The case itself suggests a greater awareness 
of importance of enforcing human traffick-
ing laws among Canadian law enforcement 
officers and prosecutors, and a greater 
willingness to take aggressive measures 
to protect victims and punish perpetrators. 
Initially, Domotor Sr. was released on CAD 
$50,000 bail and the Justice of the Peace 
ordered him to surrender his passport, 
refrain from travelling outside Ontario, and 
remain in his home unless accompanied by 
one or more of his sureties. Additionally, 
he was ordered not to have any contact 
with his alleged trafficking victims or have 
any foreign nationals residing with him. 
However, at the time of printing, Domotor 
Sr.’s bail was revoked and he was in cus-
tody awaiting trial. 
u.S. reSumeS deportationS of 
haitian nationalS amidSt cholera 
epidemic
Wildrick Guerrier, a Haitian national 
and a long-time resident of the U.S., died of 
cholera-like symptoms in an overcrowded 
Haitian jail approximately one week after 
the U.S. deported him for a conviction of 
firearms possession. Subjecting Guerrier 
to the life-threatening conditions of Haitian 
jails appears to be grossly disproportionate 
to his offense.
In a February press release, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) urged the United States to halt 
deportations of Haitians with serious ill-
nesses or family ties in the U.S. The 
IACHR asserted that deportation could 
endanger the lives of Haitian nationals due 
to the continuing humanitarian crisis in 
Haiti. The Haitian government routinely 
imprisons deportees with a U.S. criminal 
record. Prisons in Haiti are overcrowded 
and lack potable water, sufficient sanita-
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tion, and access to adequate medical treat-
ment, all of which contribute to the spread 
of cholera, tuberculosis, and other diseases. 
The IACHR has issued precautionary mea-
sures requesting that the U.S. suspend the 
deportation of five Haitian nationals until 
Haiti can guarantee that detention facilities 
meet the necessary minimum standards.
After the earthquake in Haiti in January 
2010, the U.S. government designated 
Haiti as a country whose nationals could 
receive temporary protected status (TPS) 
and initially suspended the deportation of 
Haitians with criminal convictions. One 
year after the earthquake hit Haiti, over 
1 million people are still displaced and 
hundreds of bodies still have not been 
pulled out of the rubble. In addition, Haiti 
continues to grapple with a cholera epi-
demic. While the TPS designation extends 
until July 2011, the U.S. resumed deporta-
tions of Haitians on January 20, 2011. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
claimed to have lifted the moratorium on 
deportations because it could not detain 
deportable Haitians indefinitely and their 
release was not in the interest of national 
security.
Many Haitians currently residing in 
the U.S. have been granted TPS. TPS 
allows foreign nationals to remain in the 
U.S. when conditions in their home coun-
tries, such as an ongoing armed conflict 
or a natural disaster, temporarily prevent 
them from returning safely. Those apply-
ing for TPS are subject to the eligibility 
requirements listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) 
and 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.2 — 244.4, however, 
meaning they must be nationals of or have 
habitually resided in a country designated 
for TPS, and must have continuous physi-
cal presence in the U.S. since that country’s 
most recent TPS designation. Most notably, 
an individual is ineligible for TPS if he 
has been convicted of any felony or two or 
more misdemeanors in the U.S., has perse-
cuted others, is otherwise subject to one of 
the bars to asylum, or is subject to one of 
the criminal or security related grounds of 
inadmissibility. These eligibility require-
ments have prevented many Haitians, like 
Guerrier, from receiving TPS. DHS’s deci-
sion to resume deportations places these 
individuals at the greatest risk as prison 
conditions in Haiti are a breeding ground 
for the spread of cholera and other dis-
eases. The current conditions in Haitian 
jails support the Center for Constitutional 
Rights’s claims that resuming deportations 
“would end up being a death sentence for 
many.”
Although the deportation and likely 
imprisonment of Haitian nationals, espe-
cially stemming from two misdemeanor 
convictions, seems to violate the guarantee 
of proportionality between punishment and 
crime under the Eighth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. The proposition that 
the Eighth Amendment does not extend to 
deportations on the ground that a depor-
tation is not a punishment for crime has 
been upheld since it was first established 
by Fing Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698 (1893). Nevertheless, there is 
something intrinsically disproportionate 
about allowing individuals convicted of 
misdemeanors to share the same fate as 
those convicted of capital offenses, given 
the likelihood that imprisonment in Haiti 
following deportation will likely lead to 
death. While the U.S. is not obligated 
to suspend the deportations of Haitians 
indefinitely or to extend TPS to ineligible 
Haitian nationals residing in the U.S., the 
humanitarian concerns in Haiti indicate 
that the timing of the agency’s decision to 
resume deportations could not be worse. 
If nothing else, the U.S. should extend the 
moratorium on deportations to Haiti until 
the health and political crisis in the country 
abates. 
extrajudicial KillingS and police 
brutality in jamaica
On January 7, 2011, Jamaican police 
killed an alleged gang leader, who neigh-
bors claim was innocent and unarmed 
when shot by police. This incident follows 
the August 2010 release of an amateur 
video showing Jamaican police shoot-
ing and gruesomely beating to death an 
unarmed man after he had been subdued. 
These incidents of police brutality and 
extrajudicial killings are not the first to sur-
face in Jamaica. Although Jamaica’s popu-
lation is less than three million, 140 people 
die in police shootings each year, making 
Jamaica’s rate of lethal police shootings 
one of the highest in the world. From 1999 
to 2009, 1,900 people were killed in police 
shootings, but only one police officer was 
convicted of manslaughter – a second was 
brought to trial and acquitted on appeal. 
Allowing extrajudicial killings denies sus-
pected criminals the rights to due process, 
humane treatment, and judicial protection.
These extrajudicial killings and inci-
dents of police brutality contravene the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR), which Jamaica ratified in 1978. 
Article 4 of the ACHR guarantees the 
right to life; Article 5, the right to humane 
treatment; Article 8, the right to due pro-
cess; and Article 25 the right to judicial 
protection. Jamaica’s systematic failure 
to conduct detailed, timely, and impartial 
investigations into police shootings and 
extrajudicial executions violates the right 
to due process and to judicial protec-
tion. The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights have 
held that state parties must undertake com-
prehensive, prompt, and impartial inves-
tigation when rights protected under the 
ACHR are violated, and that states must 
prosecute and punish those responsible for 
violations. The IACHR has specifically 
expressed concern about the police killings 
in Jamaica.
The extrajudicial killings also violate 
Jamaica’s international legal obligations 
under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 9 of 
the ICCPR guarantees the right to liberty, 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and the right to judicial proceed-
ings. Moreover, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR 
obligates States Parties to ensure that those 
whose rights have been violated have 
access to effective judicial, legislative, and 
administrative remedies. However, Jamaica 
has declared a state of emergency with 
regards to gang violence, and declared to 
the United Nations Secretary-General that 
it may therefore derogate from many of its 
obligations under the ICCPR.
The United Nations also has several 
mechanisms to protect against police bru-
tality and extrajudicial killings. Although 
these mechanisms are not legally bind-
ing, they demonstrate the international 
community’s commitment to prevent-
ing police brutality. The UN General 
Assembly adopted a Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials (Code of 
Conduct) through the passage of resolution 
34/169. Article 3 of the Code of Conduct 
states that “law enforcement officials may 
use force only when strictly necessary 
and to the extent required for the perfor-
mance of their duty.” Similarly, the UN 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders adopted the 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
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Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
(Basic Principles). The Basic Principles 
recommend that police use lethal weapons 
only when absolutely necessary to protect 
life, and beseech police to respond propor-
tionately to threats and unlawful activities. 
The Basic Principles also request the gov-
ernments of UN Member States to ensure 
that arbitrary or abusive use of force and 
firearms by law enforcement officials is 
punished as a criminal offense. Finally, the 
Basic Principles specify that exceptional 
circumstances such as internal political 
instability or other public emergencies 
may not justify any departure from these 
principles. Jamaican police use Jamaica’s 
high crime rates and gang-related vio-
lence to justify the use of disproportionate 
force. Jamaica’s National Security Ministry 
estimates that there are 268 active gangs 
in Jamaica — a country with one of the 
highest murder rates in the world. These 
statistics, however, do not justify the use of 
police brutality under the Basic Principles. 
Police must ensure public security without 
compromising human rights.
Jamaican police have attempted to 
reduce the violence in Jamaica by using 
the “hot spot” strategy, whereby police 
and military personnel flood a particular 
neighborhood and take swift action against 
gangs in the area. Opponents criticize this 
strategy as an ineffective show of force 
that does not end the gang violence. As an 
alternative, commentators have suggested 
that Jamaica institute a policy of preventive 
detention that specifically targets the drug 
kingpins and major players in the gangs. 
Preventive detention refers to a short-term 
strategy that aims to remove the leader-
ship of violent gangs and drug rings from 
society in order to prevent the emergence 
of “hot spots”— areas where the high level 
of gang violence has created a state of 
emergency. While this would eliminate the 
problem of collective punishment, it would 
also create the potential for human rights 
abuses associated with pre-trial detention, 
including potentially violating suspects’ 
rights to liberty, due process, and judicial 
proceedings.
Important elements of prevention in 
relation to extra-judicial killings and police 
brutality may be the use of a combina-
tion of human rights training for police 
officers, community policing techniques, 
improvement of support systems for police 
who feel that they are in danger, and a 
strong judicial system that enforces the 
rule of law. These types of solutions would 
eliminate the perceived need for police to 
take matters into their own hands by assur-
ing that the police are confident that the 
judicial system will effectively and justly 
punish those engaged in violence. Also, 
the judicial system must enforce the laws 
with respect to police brutality so that 
police officers are also sanctioned for their 
acts of violence. Thus, an overall strength-
ening of the rule of law is likely to help 
resolve human rights abuses perpetrated by 
Jamaican police.
Aimee Mayer, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
North America for the Human Rights Brief.
latin america 
SeeKing juStice for VictimS of 
oil exploitation in lago agrio, 
ecuador
After seventeen years of litigating 
Aguinda et al. v. Chevron Corp. in at least 
three fora, the Lago Agrio community, 
an oil-rich area in the Sucumbíos prov-
ince of Ecuador, won a judgment against 
Chevron-Texaco Corporation for its toxic-
waste contamination of the Amazon. On 
February 14, 2011, an Ecuadorean court 
awarded $8.6 billion in damages, plus 
an additional amount for punitive dam-
ages if Chevron did not publicly apologize 
within fifteen days of the court’s decision 
— Chevron did not comply. While the 
judgment may be unenforceable because 
Chevron-Texaco has no assets in Ecuador, 
it is a victory for the implementation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) and numerous other international 
agreements that protect individuals’ rights.
The court found that Texaco’s oil opera-
tions — before it merged with Chevron 
Corporation — from 1964 and 1992 pol-
luted the Ecuadorian and Peruvian rainfor-
est by not properly containing waste pits 
for toxic oil exploration byproducts. The 
pollution resulted in widespread harm to 
the environment and human health.
Two lawsuits were initially filed in 
U.S. federal court but were dismissed for 
forum non conveniens. Chevron, however, 
advocated for and agreed to litigation in 
the Ecuadorian courts. This litigation in 
Ecuador lasted approximately eight years 
prior to February’s judgment. Among 
Chevron’s defenses was that it could not be 
found liable for individual citizens’ com-
plaints because the government of Ecuador 
had released it from all liability in two sepa-
rate contracts. The court, however, rejected 
this argument, stating that on their faces, the 
agreements only referenced the government 
and not suits by individual citizens.
The court explained that even if the 
releases had included individuals, the con-
tract would be illegal and in violation of 
the fundamental rights protected under 
the Constitution of Ecuador and numer-
ous international agreements. The court 
also rejected Chevron’s argument that the 
state of Ecuador was acting on behalf of 
the Ecuadorian people, and that the gov-
ernment-signed release agreements should 
bind all Ecuadorian citizens. The court 
distinguished governmental acts of repre-
sentation, which “show the unilateral will 
of the state,” from acts where the govern-
ment is a participatory partner, such as to 
contracts with a corporation. Acts where 
the government is a partner are not acts of 
representation binding all citizens. 
Citing Ecuador’s Constitution and the 
ACHR, ratified by Ecuador in 1977, the 
court held that contracts such as the 1995 
and 1998 releases could not extinguish a 
plaintiff ’s right to bring claims. Article 8.1 
of the ACHR guarantees every person the 
right to a hearing for the determination of 
his or her rights.
The court additionally found a right to 
claims in the courts under Article 18 of the 
American Declaration of Human Rights 
and Duties of Man of 1948, Article 10 the 
Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, 
and Article 14 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. The court 
reasoned that because the Constitution and 
international agreements recognize the right 
to a hearing as a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the state, a state could not relinquish 
that right in a contract. Thus, a court could 
not interpret the Ecuadorian government’s 
prior releases with Texaco as binding on all 
affected citizens. 
Although the court’s interpretation 
of the relationship between states, trans-
national actors, and individuals upheld 
human rights in the face of a development 
model that often leaves individuals voice-
less, both parties plan to appeal the judg-
ment. Chevron-Texaco claims the trial was 
fraudulent and inconsistent with scientific 
data, despite the court’s stated attempt to 
reconcile both parties’ scientific assess-
3
Mayer et al.: International Legal Updates
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
45
ments and a court-appointed scientific 
assessment. The plaintiffs claim that the 
$8.6 billion award is insufficient to clean 
up the environmental damage.
Regardless of each party’s claims, the 
Ecuadorian court’s judgment is unenforce-
able for now because Chevron-Texaco has 
no seizable assets in Ecuador. Furthermore, 
one week before the judgment, Chevron-
Texaco obtained a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) from a U.S. court enjoining 
the plaintiffs from attempting to enforce 
a judgment from the Ecuadorian legal 
proceedings in the U.S. The TRO was 
extended in March. Overall, however, the 
decision can be seen as a step towards 
holding transnational companies account-
able for the harms they cause.
amneSty in uruguay iS rejected
The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) held that Uruguay’s 
amnesty law for crimes committed by the 
state during the 1973-1985 military dicta-
torship violated the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR). Gelman v. 
Uruguay is the first case against Uruguay 
for human rights violations to come before 
the IACtHR. Under the ACHR and the 
Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons (IACFDP), 
the IACtHR condemned Uruguay for the 
forced disappearance of María Claudia 
García Iruretagoyena de Gelman. Gelman 
was abducted as part of “Operation 
Condor,” a joint effort between the dic-
tatorships in Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, 
Brazil, and Argentina to eliminate political 
dissidents in the 1970s. In response to the 
IACtHR’s decision, the Uruguayan Senate, 
passed legislation to annul its amnesty law 
on April 12. The legislation must now go to 
the lower house for a vote.
Additionally, the IACtHR held that 
Uruguay had violated the Rights of the 
Family under Article 17 of the ACHR for 
crimes against Macarena Gelman Garcia, 
María Claudia García Iruretagoyena de 
Gelman’s daughter. Article 17(1) provides 
that the state must protect the family unit, 
as it is the “fundamental group unit of 
society.” Garcia did not learn the identity 
of her mother until her grandfather tracked 
her down twenty years after Gelman’s 
abduction.
The case was previously ineligible for 
trial in Uruguay because the amnesty law, 
the 1986 Expiry Law of Demanded State 
Punishment, prohibited nearly all judicial 
investigations into the human rights vio-
lations committed by military and state 
actors during the period covered by the 
amnesty law. The case was submitted to 
the IACtHR after Uruguay refused to fol-
low the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights’ recommendations to repeal 
the amnesty law, conduct investigations, 
and provide reparations to victims of state 
terrorism.
An alleged political dissident, Gelman 
was abducted in 1976 when she was seven 
months pregnant. While in detention, she 
gave birth to a daughter, Macarena Gelman 
Garcia. The baby was then taken from her 
and left on the doorstep of a police officer, 
who adopted and raised her. Garcia’s hus-
band, Marcelo Gelman, was also abducted, 
tortured, and assassinated. María Gelman’s 
remains have never been found.
The IACtHR found Uruguay in viola-
tion of Articles 3, 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), and 7(1) 
of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR) by depriving Gelman of 
the rights to recognition as a person before 
the law, life, personal liberty, and personal 
integrity. Uruguay ratified the Convention 
in 1985 when the dictatorship stepped 
down and therefore, is bound by its obliga-
tions and prohibitions. The IACtHR also 
found that Uruguay had violated Articles 
1 and 11 of the IACFDP, which Uruguay 
ratified in 1996, by practicing forced dis-
appearances and not holding detainees 
in officially-recognized detention centers. 
Most importantly, the IACtHR declared 
Uruguay could no longer use domestic law 
to avoid complying with its international 
obligations and should ensure the amnesty 
law is no longer used as an obstacle for 
investigations into forced disappearances.
To eliminate impunity for crimes com-
mitted during the twelve-year military rule, 
the judgment instructed Uruguay to carry 
out investigations of forced disappear-
ances and bring perpetrators to justice. The 
IACtHR also mandated the adoption of 
policies in compliance with criminal and 
administrative responsibilities under inter-
national law. In addition to reparations, the 
IACtHR ordered the state to make a public 
apology for the crimes committed, conduct 
investigations into those who remain miss-
ing, and make publically available informa-
tion regarding the forced disappearances.
The judgment in Gelman is in line with 
IACtHR jurisprudence, which prohibits the 
use of amnesty laws. In 2001, the IACtHR 
held that the Peruvian amnesty law pro-
tecting police and military officials who 
had engaged in state-sponsored terrorism 
from 1980 to 1995 violated the state’s duty 
to guarantee domestic legal effects of the 
ACHR because the state is obligated to cre-
ate national laws that uphold human rights 
enumerated in the ACHR.
Legislation annulling the amnesty law 
is pending in the lower house in Uruguay. 
If it passes, it could become law on May 
20, which is the day Uruguay honors politi-
cal dissidents who suffered forced disap-
pearances during the military dictatorship. 
Such a public and complete abandonment 
of its amnesty law would represent a sig-
nificant step towards justice and account-
ability in Uruguay, bringing it in line with 
the rest of the Inter-American system in 
this regard. 
Jessica Lynd, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
Latin America for the Human Rights Brief. 
middle eaSt and north africa
human rightS in an arab Spring
From arming pro-government protes-
tors with machetes to shooting at civilians 
from helicopters, Arab governments have 
taken extreme measures to suppress the 
protests that have been blazing across the 
Middle East for the past five months. What 
began in Tunisia spread to Egypt, where 
protestors demanding democratic reform 
and human rights dismantled long-standing 
autocratic regimes. Now civil society in 
the rest of the Arab world has taken a cue, 
believing that they too are entitled to dem-
ocratic political reform and basic social, 
political, and economic rights. 
Despite having similar demands, each 
movement in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, 
and Yemen has taken a unique form. The 
rules governing the type of permissible 
regulatory measures change as civil unrest 
grows and becomes more organized. Each 
uprising in the Middle East has triggered 
distinct international laws. This article is 
a survey of the international and domestic 
laws that have been implicated in each 
conflict, and how they have been observed 
or violated. 
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Before the protests began, the govern-
ments of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and 
Yemen all violated international law by 
prohibiting the rights to assemble and to 
freedom of expression. Articles 19 and 21 
of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) — which all five 
countries have ratified — protect these 
rights. However, Egypt’s Emergency Laws, 
Syria’s Emergency Laws, and Yemen’s Law 
No. 1 on Associations and Foundations 
prohibit gatherings without governmental 
approval. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR, 
emergency laws may suspend these rights, 
but the state of emergency may only last 
as long as the exigencies of the situation 
require. The international community has 
recognized that Syria’s emergency law of 
48 years and Egypt’s emergency law of 
43 years have long exceeded the accept-
able period. Further, in Libya, independent 
organizations are outlawed pursuant to Law 
71 of 1972; thus, any gathering by a group 
of people promoting ideologies contrary to 
the government is illegal and punishable by 
death. Finally, until lifting the restriction 
on February 15, 2011, Jordan also pro-
hibited public protests without permission 
from the government.
If protests begin to threaten public 
order, then states are entitled to enforce 
their criminal laws. Still, international law 
prohibits law enforcement officers from 
using excessive force against peaceful pro-
testors. The Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials (Code of Conduct) 
and the Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (Basic Principles) codified inter-
national norms regulating law enforcement 
officials’ actions. Those documents, which 
were adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1979 and 1990, respectively, 
draw upon the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR, 
the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. The Basic Principles articulate 
that law enforcement officials may only 
use firearms in self-defense, in defense of 
others against the imminent threat of death 
or serious injury, or to arrest and prevent 
the escape of those presenting an imminent 
threat of death or serious injury. Even then, 
officers must clearly identify themselves, 
warn of their intent to use firearms, and use 
force only to the minimum extent neces-
sary when dispersing unlawful assemblies. 
In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi’s forces 
are violating these international provisions 
by using warplanes and snipers to shoot 
indiscriminately at civilian protestors and 
to shoot at any group with more than 
three people. Additionally, in Egypt and 
Syria, there have been widespread reports 
of police officers using live ammunition 
against retreating protestors, in violation of 
the governing international treaties. In fact, 
government officials in Syria have killed 
hundreds of protestors. The government in 
Yemen has also been using live ammuni-
tion against protestors, and even coordi-
nated sniper attacks on a protest camp in 
March, killing 52 people. In Jordan, on 
the other hand, there have been no reports 
implicating police officers with using force 
against protestors.
It should be especially noted that 
Article 8 of the Code of Conduct calls on 
officers to rigorously oppose and prevent 
any violations of the law and to prevent 
violence. Police officers in all five of 
these Arab countries have stood by as pro-
government supporters, widely suspected 
of being government-paid thugs, violently 
attacked peaceful pro-democracy activ-
ists. By failing to take any action as the 
suspected thugs attacked, the police forces 
in all of the states have violated Article 8.
Armed Opposition
If the protestors arm themselves, as 
they have in Libya and Yemen, then the 
state has a limited right to use force 
against the protesters. That right expands 
and different rights govern once the con-
flict reaches a certain threshold, rising to 
the level of a non-international armed con-
flict. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions provides that International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and ten-
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence, and other similar acts. 
This is generally recognized as custom-
ary international law. But once opposi-
tion movements begin to coordinate their 
attacks under an organized command 
structure in a contracted conflict, IHL is 
triggered. In that case, the state would have 
the right to attack opposition movements 
just as it would be able to attack enemies 
during war. 
Security Council Resolution 1970 called 
on Libya to respect IHL while the conflict 
was developing into a non-international 
armed conflict, as it has now been catego-
rized by the president of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The 
conflict in Libya has certainly triggered 
the application of IHL, as the armed rebels 
have been organizing under the direction 
of the Rebel Council based in Benghazi. 
Accordingly, the conflict in Libya is regu-
lated by the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Additional Protocol I, Additional Protocol 
II, and customary international law. A 
fundamental principal of IHL codified by 
the Fourth Geneva Convention is civilian 
distinction, which obligates the Libyan 
government to protect civilians who are not 
participating in hostilities and prohibits the 
government from directly firing at or vio-
lently attacking unarmed civilian protes-
tors. Nevertheless, Qaddafi and his forces 
have repeatedly breached these obligations 
by directing snipers to target civilians and 
by firing cluster munitions into residential 
neighborhoods. Libyan government forces 
have also forcibly disappeared at least 
thirty civilians and rebels, in violation 
of customary international law applicable 
in non-international armed conflicts and 
international human rights law. The Libyan 
government has also employed the use of 
mercenaries to violently suppress peace-
ful protestors, in violation of Additional 
Protocol I. A mercenary is defined as any 
person who is specifically recruited locally 
or abroad for the purpose of a concerted act 
of violence to undermine the constitutional 
order of a State and is motivated by mate-
rial compensation.
In Syria and Yemen, although some 
protestors have begun to arm themselves, 
they are neither organized nor does the 
violence rise to the level of a non-interna-
tional armed conflict. For instance, there 
is no command structure and violence on 
behalf of the protestors has been sporadic. 
In accordance with ICRC provisions in 
situations not governed by IHL, if the 
struggle in Syria and Yemen does not 
amount to a non-international armed con-
flict, then the governing state authority 
must restore internal order, while respecting 
human rights. Both states have recklessly 
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disregarded this important obligation, as 
the uprisings in the two countries have 
turned deadly.
Conclusion
The revolutions across the Arab world 
have highlighted the importance of respect-
ing a wide array of international human 
rights provisions. Not only were the pro-
tests largely in response to the curtailment 
of social, economic, and political rights 
in their countries, but the very act of pro-
testing has challenged oppressive govern-
ment regulations that have disregarded key 
provisions in international human rights 
and humanitarian law. While some gov-
ernments, like Jordan, limitedly violated 
international law in trying to quell the 
protests; others, like Syria and Yemen, 
have responded with unlawful excessive 
force to the protestors’ peaceful demands 
for change. Although each movement has 
taken on a different form, they have all 
highlighted that civil society in the Arab 
world is eager and willing to fight for the 
basic rights that they have been denied for 
so long.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the Middle East and 
North Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
Sub-Saharan africa
power iS eVerything: the coStS 
of ethiopia’S ambitiouS purSuit of 
hydro-electrical power
In 2005, the government of Ethiopia 
announced an ambitious 25-year plan to 
construct a series of hydroelectric dams 
along the Omo River in an effort to become 
a regional supplier of electricity. Since 
then, Ethiopia has opened several new 
dams, including Gibe I and Gibe II, and is 
scheduled to finish construction of the con-
troversial Gibe III dam by July 2011. When 
completed, Gibe III will be the largest 
infrastructure project in Ethiopian history 
and the highest dam on the African con-
tinent. Since construction began in 2006, 
international groups have criticized the 
Ethiopian government’s failure to consult 
indigenous groups about the project or 
to conduct environmental impact assess-
ments on the region’s already fragile eco-
system. As a result of the government’s 
noncompliance with required economic 
and social safeguard policies, the African 
Development Bank, the World Bank, and 
the European Investment Bank have all 
decided not to provide loans for the proj-
ect. However, Ethiopia recently secured 
U.S. $500 million from the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to 
complete the Gibe III dam and also signed 
a memorandum of understanding for China 
to finance construction of the Gibe IV dam 
and other future projects on another river, 
the Blue Nile. 
The Omo River is the lifeline for hun-
dreds of thousands of people from eight 
distinct indigenous groups in the South 
Omo region of Ethiopia and the Lake 
Turkana region of Kenya. Opponents of 
the Gibe III project argue that the dam 
will reduce the river’s flow and threaten 
the livelihoods of thousands of people who 
rely on its natural flood cycle for food 
cultivation. Organizations such as Survival 
International and International Rivers are 
also highly critical of the government’s 
plan to lease out tracts of newly irrigated 
land to foreign investors upon completion 
of the project. Additionally, the project will 
affect Kenya’s Lake Turkana, the world’s 
largest desert lake, which receives up to 
ninety percent of its water from the Omo 
River. A hydrology study by the African 
Development Bank found that the water 
volume required to fill the Gibe III res-
ervoir would deprive Lake Turkana of 
approximately 85 percent of its normal 
annual water inflow. Furthermore, critics 
of the Gibe III assert that restricting the 
flow of the Omo River will exacerbate 
food insecurity in a remote region that has 
already suffered through a long history 
of conflict between struggling indigenous 
groups. 
Gibe III’s projected ecological and social 
impacts illustrate what is at stake as the 
Ethiopian government repeatedly fails to 
comply with its national and international 
legal obligations. Domestically, the Ethiopian 
government disregarded provisions of its 
Federal Public Procurement Directive requir-
ing competitive international bidding for 
large-scale projects by directly awarding a 
no-bid contract for Gibe III to the Italian 
construction company, Salini Costuttori, 
for more than U.S. $2 billion. After the 
contract was awarded, construction began 
in July 2006 without completion or 
approval of the Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment (ESIA) that is required 
by Ethiopian environmental law. In 2008, 
the Ethiopian Environmental Protection 
Authority retroactively approved an ESIA 
for Gibe III, without completing geological 
or baseline health studies. Contrary to ESIA 
requirements, the Ethiopian government did 
not consult any affected communities until 
after construction had already started, and 
to date only about 100 people have been 
consulted about the project. Opponents 
argue that this violates Article 92(3) of 
the Ethiopian Constitution, which requires 
consultation of affected communities. On an 
international level, the construction of Gibe 
III runs contrary to the UN Declaration 
of Indigenous Rights, which declares the 
right of indigenous people to develop, use, 
and control their traditional lands and to 
obtain redress when this land is confiscated, 
destroyed, or damaged without free, prior, 
and informed consent. Furthermore, critics 
argue that Ethiopia has violated Article 21, 
the peoples’ right to freely dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources, of the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, to 
which Ethiopia is party.
Advocacy groups maintain that no real 
or genuine effort has ever been made to 
consult the linguistically and physically 
isolated indigenous communities of the 
Lower Omo region. The managers of Gibe 
III have made very little information pub-
licly available, and numerous independent 
surveys have reported that the indigenous 
communities of the region know virtually 
nothing about the project. This problem has 
been further exacerbated by the Charities 
and Societies Proclamation passed by the 
Ethiopian Parliament in February 2009, 
which restricts any charity or NGO from 
promoting human and democratic rights in 
Ethiopia if it receives more than ten percent 
of its funding from foreign sources. The 
resulting revocation of community associa-
tion licenses by the Ethiopian government 
has restricted the ability of advocacy groups, 
the vast majority of which are funded inter-
nationally, to increase awareness within the 
country about the project and its impacts 
among affected communities.
In contrast, groups in Kenya that will 
be affected by Gibe III have been able to 
protest openly about the project and have 
garnered significant international sup-
port. In 2006, the government of Kenya 
signed a memorandum of understanding 
with Ethiopia for the purchase of 500 MW 
of electricity from the Gibe III dam. In 
response, Friends of Lake Turkana filed 
a law suit against the Kenyan government 
claiming that this agreement violates the 
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constitutional right of the Kenyan people to 
a clean and healthy environment. To date, 
no such public discourse or legal action has 
been permitted in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous 
state and currently only about two percent of 
the population have access to electricity. As 
such, the need for Ethiopia to develop and 
implement a comprehensive energy plan 
is not in dispute. But Ethiopia’s increas-
ingly repressive government has denied 
any public debate about Ethiopia’s energy 
future and has compromised the quality of 
the country’s hydroelectric dam projects. 
Opponents argue that greater transparency 
and consultation in the planning and imple-
mentation of hydropower projects could 
lessen the negative social and environmental 
impacts and result in better-designed, cost-
effective projects that comply with domes-
tic and international law. But Ethiopia’s 
government appears steadfastly opposed to 
this path. Prime Minister Zenawi has criti-
cized Western interference in the project as 
an attempt to keep Ethiopia “undeveloped 
and backward,” and has vowed to complete 
construction of all planned hydroelectric 
dams “at any cost.” At present, it appears 
that construction of Ethiopia’s massive 
dams will continue, illustrating the point 
made by Abdulhakim Mohammed, Head 
of Generation Construction at the Ethiopia 
Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO): in 
Ethiopia power is and will continue to be 
“everything.”
Catherine Davies, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, contributed this column on Sub-Saharan 
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
political obStacleS continue to 
preVent action by zimbabwe’S 
firSt human rightS commiSSion
After 31 years of independence, the 
Zimbabwean government is still struggling 
to address past human rights violations, 
including the abuses that occurred during 
the violent, disputed elections of 2008. In 
the aftermath of those events, the politi-
cal parties that formed the Government 
of National Unity (GNU) agreed to create 
a Human Rights Commission by consti-
tutional amendment, which was passed 
in 2009. The Commission’s creation ini-
tially brought hope to Zimbabweans, who 
believed that it would hold accountable 
those responsible for the government’s 
numerous past human rights abuses and 
pave the way for free and fair elections 
in the future. Nearly two years later, this 
Commission seems to have made little 
progress because of political stalemate 
delaying legislative authorization of many 
of its important functions and the govern-
ment’s failure to finance its work.
Zimbabwe’s Human Rights Commission 
derives its legal authority from Section 
100R of the constitution. Section 100R 
expressly enables the Commission to take 
over investigations initiated by the Public 
Prosecutor, to promote the development and 
awareness of human rights in Zimbabwe, 
and to investigate complaints it receives. 
Yet the specific functions that would fully 
allow the Commission to accomplish its 
investigatory functions, which are envi-
sioned under Section 100R(8), have yet to 
be conferred by parliamentary act. These 
include the independent activities that are 
typical for similar national human rights 
commissions: conducting investigations on 
its own initiative; visiting prisons, refugee 
camps, and mental institutions to evaluate 
conditions; and securing reparations for 
victims of human rights violations. 
In September 2010, the Ministry of 
Justice and Legal Affairs introduced a 
bill to grant these additional powers to 
the Commission, but the bill still has not 
passed. Human rights groups in Zimbabwe 
have blasted the proposed bill for not 
addressing past human rights abuses and the 
bill’s design. The mandate it proposes for 
the Commission explicitly does not cover 
government-sanctioned massacres against 
the Gukurahundi people. Nearly 20,000 
Matabeleland and Midlands peoples were 
killed in these massacres in the early 1980s 
under the direction of President Robert 
Mugabe. Thus, this exclusion strongly sug-
gests government interference with the 
scope of the Commission. Any bill grant-
ing the Commission extensive powers or 
enlarging its mandate to include crimes like 
the Gukurahundi massacres, would likely 
not receive support from President Mugabe 
or the ruling Zimbabwe African National 
Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. 
Zimbabwe’s Parliament is currently split 
between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, which holds 
45 percent of the seats in the Senate and the 
House of Assembly, and the Movement for 
Democratic Change, which holds approxi-
mately 51 percent of the seats. Moreover, 
any bill that passes the legislature must 
receive Presidential approval before it can 
become law. 
The current stalemate over the 
Commission’s functions carries forward 
the reluctance and delay that has plagued 
the Commission since its beginning. It 
took the GNU over a year to swear in the 
eight-member Commission in April 2010. 
Particularly controversial was the appoint-
ment of the Commission’s Chairperson, 
Reginald Austin, who was MDC’s candi-
date for the position. Recently, Austin went 
on record to express mounting frustration 
with the Commission’s slow progress: “It’s 
over a year since we were sworn in, but 
we still have no Act which gives us power 
to perform our mandate. Besides, we do 
not even know how we are going to oper-
ate because there is no law to guide us.” 
Further, the Commission requires a budget 
of approximately U.S. $8 million per year 
to accomplish its constitutional mandate, 
according to Austin, but has had no budget 
at all since its creation. 
Other African national human rights 
commissions have suffered a similar plight, 
with political will to create a strong, inde-
pendent institution failing shortly after 
creation. In 2000, Niger established its 
National Commission on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Liberties (NCHRFL). 
But, when the NCHRFL found the govern-
ment’s removal of traditional chiefs to be 
illegal in 2002, the government attempted 
to restructure it. Civil society organiza-
tions prevented the restructuring of the 
NCHRFL for a period of time. However, 
the government eventually succeeded and 
the NCHRFL now includes more gov-
ernment representation, compromising its 
independence and rendering it ineffective.
Yet, not all such commissions are 
doomed to fail. Establish in 2002, the 
Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR) is authorized to investi-
gate human rights violations and monitor 
government institutions. The KNCHR’s 
record of quick investigation and response 
to alleged abuses demonstrates that it is not 
afflicted with the same levels of political 
manipulation or incapacity as Niger’s or 
Zimbabwe’s commissions. Recently, for 
example, it investigated complaints about 
reproductive health and access to quality 
healthcare and found systematic human 
rights abuses. In response, the KNCHR 
will conduct public hearings, primarily 
in rural areas, to educate Kenyans about 
reproductive and health rights. Although 
the success of the campaign remains uncer-
tain, other human rights commissions can 
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learn from the KNCHR’s responsiveness to 
complaints and tangible activities.
The unwillingness of the Zimbabwean 
government to grant powers and fund the 
Commission comes at a delicate time 
for the country. According to Amnesty 
International, arbitrary arrests and torture 
by police forces have increased since 
February, along with excessive limitations 
on freedoms of expression and assembly. 
Six activists who organized a peaceful 
public discussion about the unrest in Egypt 
and the Middle East now face charges 
of treason and, if they are convicted, the 
death penalty. Without a functional Human 
Rights Commission to afford oversight, 
such abuses can continue unabated. 
Roushani Mansoor, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, contributed this column on Sub-Saharan 
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
europe
media law in hungary raiSeS 
concernS among european 
community and teStS eu 
credibility
On January 1, 2011, a new media law 
entered into force in Hungary that, as 
Amnesty International warns, will impose 
potentially wide-ranging restrictions on 
freedom of expression. The Media Services 
and Mass Media Act (the Act) establishes 
two government-appointed entities, the 
National Media and Communications 
Authority (NMHH) and the Media Council, 
which are vested with the power to oversee 
and regulate all media outlets. These two 
entities extend state control to all realms of 
public and private media. Such expansive 
state control, in conjunction with poorly 
defined regulatory standards, represents 
a very real threat to the freedom of the 
press that is guaranteed by the Hungarian 
Constitution and Article 10 of European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
For this reason, the Act is rousing great 
concern, particularly in light of Hungary’s 
current role in the eighteen-month Trio 
Presidency of the European Union. 
The architect behind the Act is the cur-
rent Fidesz government, which won the 
2010 elections by a two-thirds majority. 
The conservative Fidesz government has 
faced recent criticism for rapid centraliza-
tion of political power and increased state 
control of formerly independent govern-
ment institutions.
Under the Act, the Media Council will 
use poorly defined standards to regulate 
television, radio stations, newspapers, 
online news sources, and even personal 
blogs. Some of these standards include 
protection of public order, lack of balance, 
and appropriate information in relation 
to public affairs. The ambiguity of the 
criteria could lead to self-censorship by 
media in order to avoid fines. Moreover, 
the government’s direct appointment of the 
NMHH members, without parliamentary 
approval, raises concerns that the body 
will lack political independence. In addi-
tion, the nine-year renewable and unlim-
ited terms for the Media Council’s five 
members may concentrate control over 
the media among a few hands and, thus, 
undermine media pluralism. Finally, one 
of the Media Council’s most worrisome 
powers is its authority to impose fines 
of up to €300,000 for periodicals and 
€730,000 for broadcast media that violate 
the Act. After such a violation, media com-
panies may also be denied future licenses.
The Act has sparked heated debate and 
protest within Hungary. On January 27, 
2011, several thousand protesters gathered, 
for a second time, at the parliament build-
ing in Budapest to demonstrate against the 
Act and demand freedom of the press. Yet, 
some argue that the Act protects society by 
providing for the regulation of media that, 
according to the text of the law, “infringe[s] 
upon human dignity”; discriminates on 
grounds of gender, racial or ethnic origin, or 
nationality; or exposes minors to programs 
that may impair their development such as 
those involving pornography or extreme 
violence. Just the day after the law was 
enacted, opposition parties in the Hungarian 
Parliament appealed it to the country’s 
Constitutional Court. However, chances for 
overturn are slim given the Court’s support 
for the ruling Fidesz party.
The Media Act has received harsh 
criticism. Many European nations criti-
cize the Act for violating Article 62 of 
Hungary’s constitution, which recognizes 
freedom of the press, as well as Article 
10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the 
right to freedom of expression, and the EU 
Audiovisual and Media Services Directive 
(AVMS). The AVMS aims to coordinate 
national EU Member States’ legislation 
concerning traditional TV broadcasts and 
“on-demand” services, including blogs 
and videos. Goals of the AVMS include 
safeguarding media pluralism, preserv-
ing cultural diversity, and guaranteeing 
the political independence of national 
media regulators. The new Hungarian Act 
also runs counter to the standards of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), including the right 
to free media, editorial independence, 
and media pluralism. The OSCE issued a 
strongly-worded statement, declaring that 
the Act “violates OSCE media freedom 
standards and endangers editorial inde-
pendence and media pluralism.” With the 
new Fidesz government receiving criticism 
from certain political and media segments, 
there are concerns that the new law will be 
used to suppress such expression.
With Hungary having assumed the 
Presidency of the EU Council on the same 
day the Act was passed, the EU’s credibility 
and its protection of fundamental rights are 
also at stake. Debates have been held in 
Strasbourg by the EU Civil Liberties and 
Culture Committees to assess the Act’s 
legality. In a January 21, 2011 letter to 
Hungary’s Deputy Prime Minister Tibor 
Navracsics, European Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes outlined three main points of con-
cern: the Media Act’s “balanced broad-
cast” requirement, which permits poten-
tially restrictive regulation of media that 
takes one side of an issue; the “country of 
origin” principle that allows for censorship 
of foreign broadcasts; and the registration 
requirement for all media, which would cre-
ate an “unjustified restriction” on the fun-
damental right of “freedom of expression.”
The European Commission requested 
more information on the law to determine 
whether it complies with EU legislation and 
fundamental rights and gave Hungary until 
February 4, 2011 to respond. As a result of 
such pressure, the Hungarian government 
agreed to review its media laws to ensure 
that they conform to EU legislation, after 
which the EU will make a legal assessment 
to determine if the changes are in line with 
European policy on media freedom. On 
February 16, 2011, the communications 
secretary for the Hungary state said that 
proposed amendments to the law, including 
adjustments to the balanced-coverage pro-
visions, would be submitted to Parliament 
within two weeks. Following these amend-
ments, if the European Commission deter-
mines that Hungary has failed to comply 
with EU law, the European Commission 
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has reserved the right to send a formal 
notice letter to the Hungarian govern-
ment, initiating a legal proceeding against 
the country’s government. The Hungarian 
government has assured the Commission 
that they are listening to its concerns and 
are willing to take appropriate action. 
Although this engagement is promising, 
it remains unclear whether it will be suf-
ficient to keep the Act from undermining 
freedom of the press. 
the uK defieS european court 
of human rightS by denying all 
priSonerS the right to Vote
Six years after the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the 
United Kingdom’s law denying prisoners 
the right to vote is a violation of Article 
3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
UK lawmakers have yet to implement the 
Court’s ruling. In November 2010, the 
Council of Europe requested that the UK 
government implement the ECtHR’s judg-
ment within six months.
The 2005 decision in Hirst v. The United 
Kingdom (No. 2) affirming the right of UK 
prisoners to vote has led to considerable 
international pressure on the UK to change 
its policy. The case originated from a 2001 
application lodged with the ECtHR by 
a convicted prisoner in the UK, and was 
appealed to the ECtHR Grand Chamber in 
October 2005 which upheld the ruling of 
the Court. Specifically, the ECtHR ruled 
that the ability to vote is a right, not a privi-
lege, of all UK citizens, including prison-
ers. In Hirst, the ECtHR stated that “pris-
oners in general continue to enjoy all of the 
rights and freedoms [including the right to 
vote] guaranteed under the Convention, 
save the right to liberty.” Additionally, the 
ECtHR stated that national legislatures can 
impose restrictions on prisoners’ right to 
vote so long as they are tailored to par-
ticular offenses or offenses of a particular 
gravity. According to the ECtHR, deny-
ing convicted prisoners this right without 
consideration of the length of the individ-
ual’s sentence or the gravity of the offense 
constitutes disproportionate punishment. 
The ECtHR determined that an “automatic 
blanket ban imposed on all convicted pris-
oners, which was arbitrary in its effects, 
could no longer be said to serve the aim 
of punishing the applicant once his tariff 
(time period representing retribution and 
deterrence) had expired.” 
British law has denied prisoners the 
right to vote for over 140 years. This limi-
tation is currently codified in Section 3 of 
the Representation of the People Act of 
1983 (the Act) which states “A convicted 
person during the time that he is detained 
in a penal institution in pursuance of his 
sentence or unlawfully at large when he 
would otherwise be so detained is legally 
incapable of voting at any parliamentary 
or local government election.” The law is 
rooted in the concept that incarceration 
not only removes prisoners from society, 
but also limits the enjoyment of prisoners’ 
individual rights, including the right to 
vote, and the right to liberty. A convicted 
person is defined in the Act as any person 
found guilty of an offense (whether under 
the law of the UK or not) including a per-
son found guilty by a court of a service 
(Armed Forces) offense but not including 
a person dealt with by committal or other 
summary process for contempt of court. 
Once released from prison, however, a 
former prisoner’s right to vote is reinstated. 
Similar laws preventing prisoners from 
voting regardless of the length of their 
sentence or the gravity of the offense com-
mitted are in force in eight other European 
states. However, based on the Rules of 
Court for the ECtHR, until a legal chal-
lenge is brought in the aforementioned 
countries, the European Council will not 
proactively demand changes to the coun-
tries’ domestic legislation.
The prolonged legal argument between 
the ECtHR and the UK may be coming to 
an end. In late February 2011, the House 
of Commons voted 234 to 22 to uphold the 
ban on prisoners’ right to vote. Although the 
House of Commons decision is not binding 
until it is passed by the House of Lords, it is 
an indicator of the strong attitude to do only 
“the minimum necessary” to comply with 
ECtHR. This could include only allowing 
prisoners serving shorter prison sentences 
to vote. Additionally, in early March, the 
UK requested that the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR review and consider overturning 
the ruling in Hirst. The ECtHR will review 
the UK’s compliance under the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation, a concept devel-
oped by the ECtHR which provides defer-
ence to the differing methods states use in 
implementing requirements of the ECHR. 
However, before the Grand Chamber can 
rule on the implementation, the judges must 
first determine whether to review the case 
de novo.
On March 9, 2011, after reviewing 
Britain’s response to the Hirst ruling, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe issued an unprecedented warning 
to the British Government that they must 
take urgent steps to enable prisoners to 
vote in the forthcoming general election. 
If the UK decides not to implement the 
ECtHR’s requirements in their domestic 
policy, the ECtHR, under Article 41 of the 
ECHR granting the court jurisdiction to 
afford just satisfaction to injured parties, 
may order the UK to pay compensation to 
prisoners who were denied the right. The 
Parliament’s disregard for the ECtHR’s 
decision presents the UK government with 
the challenge of deciding between the dem-
ocratically elected legislature’s decision 
and compliance with the ECtHR’s ruling. 
The future of the UK ban on prisoners’ 
right to vote also has important impli-
cations for the authority of the ECtHR 
as members of the UK Parliament have 
criticized the power of the ECtHR to rule 
counter to the decisions of Parliament. 
This issue has breathed life into fringe 
debates on whether the UK could withdraw 
from the ECHR and the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR. Given that the UK was among 
the first countries to ratify the ECHR, and 
has had a good record of complying with 
the ECtHR judgments, withdrawal from 
the ECHR is highly unlikely. Due to the 
wide publicity that this issue has received, 
the potential negative impact on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the ECtHR is of great 
concern and will depend on the upcoming 
decisions of the UK Parliament. 
Molly Hofsommer, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, covers Europe for the Human Rights Brief.
South and central aSia
protecting religion or proScribing 
expreSSion?: paKiStan’S blaSphemy 
law
Defamation of the Prophet Muhammad 
in Pakistan is punishable by death, under 
the state’s blasphemy law. As a State Party 
to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), Pakistan 
is bound to respect and ensure civil and 
political rights, including one’s opinions. 
However, in January 2011, the Pakistani 
government charged a seventeen-year-old 
student for scribbling derogatory remarks 
about the Prophet Muhammad on an exam. 
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The police have refused to report what 
Muhammad Samiullah wrote because 
doing so would also be “blasphemous.”
The blasphemy law was added to 
Article 295-C of Pakistan’s criminal code 
in 1986, after General Zia-ul-Haq intro-
duced the Islamic Sharī˒ ah legal code. 
Blasphemy is defined as the act of speak-
ing sacrilegiously of a religious leader 
or things sacred to a religion. Pakistan’s 
blasphemy law mandates the death penalty 
or life imprisonment for those who defame 
the Prophet. Hundreds of people have been 
charged under the law since its incep-
tion, even for merely disrespectful indirect 
insinuations.
Pakistan signed and is bound by the 
ICCPR in 2008, but has made several 
key reservations, including to two articles 
relevant to alleged religious defamation. 
Article 18 authorizes the right to freedom 
of thought and religion and Article 19 
allows one to hold opinions without inter-
ference. Pakistan rejected these provisions 
insofar as they conflict with Pakistani and 
Sharī˒ ah law. Furthermore, Pakistan is not 
a party to the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, 
which would subject Pakistan to the juris-
diction of the United Nations (UN) Human 
Rights Council. Because Pakistan refused 
to be fully bound by the ICCPR’s freedom 
of expression standards or the Human 
Rights Council’s enforcement mechanism, 
challenging the blasphemy law will be 
very difficult from the international law 
perspective.
However, the application of the blas-
phemy law also appears discriminatory 
because prosecutions tend to specifically 
target members of religions other than 
Islam. Articles 26 and 27 of the ICCPR are 
fully binding on Pakistan. Article 26 calls 
for states parties to treat all persons as equal 
before the law and prohibits discrimination 
based on religion or opinion. Additionally, 
Article 27 specifically protects the right of 
minority religions to practice.
According to a Human Rights Watch 
report, the blasphemy law only protects 
Islam, and as a result, Christians and 
Ahmadiyya — Muslims who do not believe 
Muhammad was the final prophet — have 
come under attack. A 2010 Freedom House 
report notes that while Christians and 
Ahmadiyya make up only two percent of 
the population, they represent nearly half 
of the more than 900 prosecutions for blas-
phemy. For instance, in November 2010, 
a Christian mother of five was sentenced 
to death for criticizing Islam to a group 
of female farmhands. This is the first time 
that a woman has been convicted under the 
blasphemy law.
Fortunately, death sentences under the 
blasphemy law are almost universally over-
turned or commuted on appeal, and no 
one in Pakistan has yet been put to death 
under the blasphemy law. However, oppo-
nents of the blasphemy law have expressed 
uneasiness with the death penalty even 
being an option. Their uneasiness grew in 
November 2010, when a member of the 
conservative Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 
tabled and ended discussion on a bill that 
would prohibit death sentences for blas-
phemy convictions. Even though no one 
has been put to death under the blasphemy 
law, opposition parties and judges who 
have pardoned the convicted have been 
killed in reaction to their decisions.
Also, under pressure from the PPP 
leadership and after death threats from 
various sources, former Minister Sherry 
Rehman withdrew efforts to complete a 
draft amendment to the blasphemy law. 
According to Rehman, Prime Minister 
Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani refused to allow 
Parliament to even discuss the amend-
ment proscribing the death penalty and 
disbanded the committee to amend laws.
On March 24, 2011, the UN Human 
Rights Council adopted Resolution A/
HRC/16/L.38 “Combating intolerance, 
negative stereotyping and stigmatization 
of, and discrimination, incitement to vio-
lence, and violence against persons based 
on religion or belief.” The non-binding 
Resolution encourages states to combat 
religious discrimination without limiting 
freedom of expression. Pakistan is directly 
addressed in the Resolution, and the 
Council recently interviewed some individ-
uals negatively affected by the blasphemy 
law before the Resolution was adopted.
Pakistan is free to make reservations 
when it accedes to international human 
rights instruments, but it is clear that 
further efforts need to be made to protect 
freedom of religion and speech in Pakistan. 
In order to do so, Pakistan could rescind 
its reservations to the ICCPR and become 
party to the Optional Protocol. Otherwise, 
the protection of one view of one religion 
is likely to continue to take priority over 
the protection of individual rights.
hiS day in court? Sri lanKan 
preSident Sued in the united StateS
On January 28, 2011, family members 
of three people allegedly killed in viola-
tion of the 1991 Torture Victim Protection 
Act (TVPA) sued Sri Lankan President 
Percy Mahendra “Mahinda” Rajapaksa. 
The petition in Manoharan v. Mahendra 
Rajapaksa was filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia 
to seek thirty million dollars in damages 
for victims of the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
The plaintiffs’ lawyers, however, have seri-
ous hurdles to overcome regarding notice, 
jurisdiction, and immunity.
The Manoharan suit comes in the 
wake of a 25-year conflict between the 
Sri Lankan government and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which 
ended in May 2009. The ethnic civil war 
led to thousands of civilian casualties and 
injuries, as well as forced disappearances. 
The conflict came to a head in 2009 when 
government forces pushed the LTTE into a 
small area in northeastern Sri Lanka.
In Manoharan, the petitioners bring six 
claims under the TVPA against President 
Rajapaksa for deaths occurring during the 
Sri Lankan civil war. The TVPA allows civil 
suits to be filed in the United States against 
individuals acting in official capacities who 
commit torture or extrajudicial killing.
The plaintiffs filed the complaint on 
behalf of six people who were killed in Sri 
Lanka. Ragihar Manoharan was a twenty-
year-old college graduate and member 
of the ethnic Tamil minority. Sri Lankan 
security forces allegedly beat him and 
shot him in the back of the head. Premas 
Anandarajah was one of seventeen human-
itarian workers from Action Contre La 
Faim (“Action Against Hunger”) who was 
deployed to the town of Muttur to pro-
vide aid. Despite clear markings on the 
group’s compound as a neutral humani-
tarian aid organization (making it illegal 
to attack), Sri Lankan military forces alleg-
edly attacked the compound and mas-
sacred everyone there. The third plaintiff 
represents four members of the Thevarajah 
family who were huddled in a no-fire zone 
bunker when the Sri Lankan Navy alleg-
edly bombarded them with artillery shells.
The plaintiffs allege that these acts 
violated the TVPA because the killings 
were committed extrajudicially under the 
authority of the government. The TVPA 
provides a cause of action for extrajudicial 
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killings, which occur when a governmen-
tal authority kills a person without going 
through the proper legal or judicial chan-
nels. The plaintiffs claim that the actions 
were committed “under color of foreign 
law under the command and control” of 
Sri Lanka’s military and security forces 
under President Rajapaksa.
 Under the TVPA, plaintiffs must also 
show that all local remedies have been 
exhausted. The plaintiffs contend that 
justice cannot be properly rendered in 
Sri Lanka because the defendant has “polit-
ically compromised” the court system, and 
the plaintiffs’ lives would be put at risk 
by returning to Sri Lanka. An alternate 
forum, Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was 
established in 2010 to investigate issues 
surrounding the civil war, but does not 
have a mandate to hear individual claims. 
The Manoharan petitioners may find 
it difficult to fulfill the rigors of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, includ-
ing requirements for service and personal 
jurisdiction, since the defendant is not only 
a foreign citizen, but also a sitting head of 
state. The Manoharan plaintiffs assert per-
sonal jurisdiction in federal district court 
because the act “arose from a tortious 
act in the District of Columbia,” and the 
alleged violations fall under international 
customary law. The complaint, however, 
does not support its assertion that any of 
the acts at issue took place in the District 
of Columbia, since the complaint is about 
violations that took place in Sri Lanka.
In order to satisfy service requirements, 
the plaintiff in Manoharan requested 
the Clerk of the U.S. District Court to 
send a summons and complaint by mail 
to President Rajapaksa’s residence in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka. Additionally, the 
attorneys attempted to fulfill service 
obligations under the Hague Convention 
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents and sought an 
order from the district court authorizing 
service of summons and complaint on 
the Sri Lankan embassy in the District 
of Columbia, so as not to conflict with 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Immunity. As of publication, 
the case has been assigned to Judge Colleen 
Kollar-Kotelly, but no further public infor-
mation regarding service of process on the 
defendant is available.
In Mwani v. bin Laden, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit ruled that service of process was 
met against a terrorist or terrorist orga-
nization when it was published in two 
American publications and a London-based 
Arabic language publication for six weeks. 
However, this holding is seemingly limited 
to terrorist organizations and perhaps orga-
nizations that cannot be reached through 
traditional methods of service. In Mwani, 
the court specifically discusses the impos-
sibility of knowing a terrorist organiza-
tion’s address. This method of service did 
not apply to the Afghanistan government, 
which was also a party to the suit. Because 
the Manoharan defendant has a permanent 
address, unlike the Mwani defendants, the 
Mwani publication standard would likely 
not be sufficient, and the plaintiffs would 
need to use another method of service.
In addition to the notice and service 
hurdles, the Manoharan plaintiffs also face 
immunity challenges under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA). The 
FSIA prohibits plaintiffs from bringing 
most non-commercial suits against for-
eign states, their political subdivisions, 
and their instrumentalities and agencies. 
Under Chuidian v. Philippine National 
Bank, individuals can also qualify as an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state. Other types of immunities, including 
immunity under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, may also block the 
plaintiffs’ claims.
Specifically related to the TVPA, 
in Belhas v. Ya Alon, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision 
to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion under the FSIA where the foreign 
defendant became available for service of 
process when he traveled to the District of 
Columbia for a think tank fellowship. The 
Court ruled that the TVPA does not exempt 
individuals from the FSIA, so an individual 
may still enjoy immunity when he acts 
in his official state capacity. The FSIA 
could bar the suit against the Sri Lankan 
president because the claim occurred in 
the president’s capacity as an executive 
official.
While the TVPA allows foreign plain-
tiffs to recover damages for extrajudi-
cial killings, there are serious procedural 
and substantive challenges to bring these 
claims, even beyond those mentioned here. 
While the possibility of suing the Sri 
Lankan president is a step toward achiev-
ing justice, the Manoharan attorneys have 
an uphill battle to recover damages.
Misty Seemans, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law cov-
ers the South and Central Asia for the Human 
Rights Brief. 
SoutheaSt aSia and oceana
rohingyaS SeeKing protection and 
refuge
The Rohingyas are a Muslim ethnic 
group located in the Rakhine (Arakan) 
State of southwestern Burma. According 
to Human Rights Watch, the Rohingyas 
are subjected to systematic persecution 
and human rights abuses at the hand of the 
Burmese government, on account of their 
ethnic identity. Abuses include extrajudi-
cial killings, forced labor, forced land con-
fiscation, torture, and restrictions on the 
freedom of movement. Additionally, the 
Burmese government continually refuses to 
grant the group citizenship, rendering them 
stateless in their own “ancestral home-
land.” The persecution of the Rohingyas in 
their homeland is further intensified by the 
fact that they are unable to seek protection 
from neighboring countries. 
Recently, a group of 91 Rohingyas 
claimed that on January 19, 2011, the Thai 
navy set them out to sea in an engineless 
boat with limited food and water. The 
Rohingyas had fled the ethnic persecution 
in Burma, but were apprehended in Thai 
waters while trying to cross into Malaysia 
in search of work. They landed on India’s 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands in early 
February. International human rights orga-
nizations have asked India, Indonesia, and 
Thailand to grant the Rohingyas refugee 
status in accordance with their obligations 
under Articles 14 (right to seek and enjoy 
in other countries asylum) and 15 (right to 
a nationality) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR). These organi-
zations are also requesting that the three 
countries allow the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
access the Rohingyas in order to provide 
emergency assistance as well as counsel-
ing and advice on attaining refugee status. 
If the Rohingyas are denied refugee status 
and forced to return to Burma, they would 
be at risk of continued or aggravated 
human rights violations. 
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Thai authorities have denied charges 
that they set Rohingyan refugees out to sea 
and claim that they returned the 91 per-
sons detained in Thailand to Burma in late 
January 2011. Panitan Wattanayagorn, the 
Thai government spokesperson, claimed it 
was “unlikely” that the Thai navy pushed 
the Rohingya refugees out to sea, but that 
a government investigation would take 
place. Wattanayagorn explained that the 
normal practice is to “prosecute refugees 
who illegally enter Thai waters and then 
deport them via land.” However, accord-
ing to Amnesty International, the Thai 
government had previously pushed hun-
dreds of Rohingya asylum-seekers to sea in 
“unseaworthy” boats in late 2008 and early 
2009, leading to an undisclosed number of 
fatalities, and diminishing the credibility 
of Thailand’s denial of current charges. 
Further, a June 2008 report by the U.S. 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI) gave Thailand’s refugee policy 
“mixed reviews”; although Thailand has 
hosted 1.2 million refugees over the past 
30 years, it has refused to recognize most 
refugees from Burma and has confined 
thousands of Burmese refugees in camps 
along the Burma-Thailand border with 
diminished rights. 
The Rohingyas are stateless persons 
because of direct discrimination by the 
Burmese government in its refusal to grant 
the minority group citizenship. As stateless 
persons, the Rohingyas have “no access to 
employment, schools, health care, police 
protection, or other public services.” They 
cannot even freely move about the coun-
try, as they must get permission from 
local authorities to travel from one vil-
lage to another. This stateless condition 
affects every aspect of daily life. According 
to Human Rights Watch, the Burmese 
government’s “violent and discrimina-
tory treatment” of the Rohingyas directly 
contributes to their chronic poverty and 
has forced around 300,000 Rohingyas to 
flee to nearby Bangladesh. However, the 
Rohingyas still face serious problems in 
Bangladesh due to their lack of official 
documentation, and they often live in refu-
gee camps with “primitive and squalid 
conditions.” They are neither given official 
resident status nor work authorization, thus 
perpetuating vicious cycles of arrest, long-
term detention, deportation to Burma, and 
illegal re-entry via traffickers. Still, the 
Rohingyas continue fleeing to Bangladesh 
because, according to the Arakan Rohingya 
National Organization, they believe the 
country shares “the bonds of Islamic fra-
ternity,” and therefore has a “historical and 
moral obligation to endeavor for a perma-
nent solution of the Rohingya problem.” 
Although Thailand, India, and Indonesia 
have not ratified the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 
Protocol, the countries still have legal obli-
gations under customary international law 
to grant the Rohingyas refugee status. For 
example, the UDHR has identified univer-
sal human rights to nationality and to seek 
protection from persecution on account of 
political crimes or other acts inconsistent 
with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
Further, India and Thailand, as members 
of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee, 
are obligated to become parties to and 
implement international conventions pro-
viding for the protection of refugees; admit 
refugees to their territories, not excluding 
those in the most destitute categories; and 
promote the assimilation of refugees, espe-
cially by facilitating their naturalization. 
The UNHCR’s official website explains, 
“States with a demonstrated interest in 
and devotion to the solution of refugee 
problems” are considered for membership 
in the Executive Committee. Therefore, 
failure of these two countries to grant the 
Rohingyas refugee status calls into ques-
tion their dedication to protecting the most 
destitute refugees. More importantly, the 
three countries’ failure to affirmatively 
act deprives the Rohingyas of a universal 
human right under the UDHR — the right 
to seek and enjoy asylum — while continu-
ing to subject them to unstable living con-
ditions, excluded from state recognition, 
protections, and life-saving services.
illegal intercountry adoptionS: 
Vietnam’S progreSS and remaining 
challengeS
Intercountry adoption (ICA) began as 
a humanitarian effort after World War II 
to place orphaned children, for whom a 
state could not find a family domesti-
cally, into families of willing foreigners. 
In recent decades, ICA has grown into 
a complex and substantially commercial 
enterprise, lending itself to manipulation 
and abuse. Such abuse is particularly evi-
dent in Vietnam, which began engaging 
in ICA in the 1970s, and is now one of 
the leading countries of origin of illegal 
adoptions, primarily due to adoption scams 
and kidnappings conducted by unofficial 
adoption agencies. International Social 
Service (ISS), a non-profit organization 
that assists internationally separated fami-
lies, estimates that approximately 1,000 
Vietnamese children are adopted annually 
by families residing in the United States, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.
Vietnam is a State Party to the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
The state’s failure to curb its illegal adop-
tion market violates Article 10 of the 
ICESCR guaranteeing the “widest pos-
sible [state-provided] protections and assis-
tance” to families, particularly while they 
are “responsible for the care and educa-
tion of dependent children.” Illicit actors 
taking advantage of lax enforcement of 
laws or nonexistent adoption regulations 
and familial protections have, easily and 
with impunity, dismantled the Vietnamese 
family by unlawfully taking children from 
their biological families. Such actions also 
violate provisions of the UN’s Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) to which 
Vietnam is also a State Party. The CRC 
provides that States Parties must: respect 
the right of the child to preserve his/her 
family relations as recognized by the law 
(Article 8), take measures to combat the 
illicit transfer of children abroad (Article 
11), and ensure that ICA does not result in 
improper financial gain for those involved 
in it (Article 21(d)). 
A case that recently surfaced illustrates 
the need for reform of Vietnam’s adop-
tion framework. The case concerned a 
2006 adoption scam of thirteen ethnic Ruc 
children from Vietnam’s Quang Binh prov-
ince. The biological parents have unsuc-
cessfully lobbied for information about 
their children’s whereabouts. They submit-
ted complaints to authorities and openly 
accused the responsible organization — 
which operates under regulation the Quang 
Binh Province’s Department of Labor, War 
Invalids, and Social Affairs — of giving up 
their children for adoption by foreigners 
without the parents’ consent. 
The 1993 Hague Adoption Convention 
(Convention) promulgated international 
safeguards and standards for the ICA pro-
cess to be implemented by States Parties. 
According to the U.S. Department of State 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, the goal of the 
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Convention’s drafters was to make adop-
tion a last resort, and additionally “aims 
to prevent the abduction, sale of, or traffic 
in children, and [if adoption is necessary,] 
it works to ensure that intercountry adop-
tions are in the best interests of children.” 
A state joining the Convention must estab-
lish that it has a central authority, which 
will function as the authoritative source of 
information as well as the point of contact. 
This central authority must also oversee 
the accreditation of adoption agencies that 
comply with uniform standards and ensure 
professional and ethical practices, includ-
ing the itemization and written disclosure 
of the estimated expenses associated with 
each adoption beforehand. More than sev-
enty states are party to the Convention, 
including the United States. 
Due to increasing awareness of child 
trafficking and pressure on the Vietnamese 
government to better regulate its adop-
tion agencies and procedures, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
Vietnam, and the Department of Adoption 
of the Ministry of Justice of Vietnam 
commissioned a study to identify and 
address problems in both domestic and 
intercountry adoptions. The study, con-
ducted by ISS and released in August 
2010, identified inadequacy and inconsis-
tency within the procedures for ensuring 
“free and informed consent” by biological 
parents. Accordingly, it urged Vietnamese 
authorities to: clarify the laws regarding 
parental consent for the adoption; establish 
an official system of data collection for 
children in need of adoption; assess the 
causes of child abandonment, relinquish-
ment, and separation; and develop social 
service programs to address those causes. 
In response to the study, the National 
Assembly of Vietnam passed a law on child 
adoption, which took effect on January 
1, 2011. This law better considers the 
rights and interests of adopted children. It 
requires that officials handling child adop-
tion issues must: 1) respect the child’s right 
to live in his or her original environment; 
2) ensure the lawful rights and interests 
of the adopted child and the adopting 
parents are respected (i.e., a voluntary 
procedure, no sex discrimination, consis-
tency with social norms); and 3) assure 
that no willing Vietnamese family can be 
found before permitting a non-resident 
adoption. Passing this new law enabled 
Vietnam’s Ambassador to the Netherlands, 
Huynh Minh Chinh, to sign the Convention 
on December 16, 2010. However, as of 
May 2011, Vietnam is still considered a 
“non-member” on the Convention’s official 
website. 
Despite the enactment of the new law 
and its scheduled implementation, the U.S. 
Department of State has not lifted its 
ban on ICA with Vietnam. In September 
2008, the U.S. suspended adoptions 
from Vietnam, and the most recent State 
Department advisory notice, issued in July 
2010, asserted that “important steps must 
still be taken before Vietnam completes 
this reform process and before intercountry 
adoptions between the United States and 
Vietnam can resume.” These steps may 
include: decreasing fraudulent documenta-
tion or the improper issuance of official 
documents based on incorrect informa-
tion, as was the case with at least one 
of the thirteen Ruc children; eliminating 
corruption and other official participation 
in illegal adoptions; and shutting down 
unlicensed facilities that prey upon single 
pregnant women by providing them sup-
port in exchange for relinquishing parental 
rights. If implemented, these measures, 
in addition to Vietnam’s accession to the 
Convention, will aid the success of adop-
tion reforms and hopefully bring an end to 
illegal ICA practices in Vietnam. 
Leah Chavla, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
Southeast Asia and Oceana for the Human 
Rights Brief.
eaSt aSia
the right to conScientiouS 
objection and how South Korea 
fallS Short
On February 10, 2011, Baek Jong-
geon conscientiously objected to manda-
tory service in South Korea’s military. 
The 26 year old Jehovah’s Witness faces 
eighteen months in jail for violating the 
country’s Military Service Act (MSA), 
which requires all 19 to 35 year old Korean 
men to serve a 21 to 24 month long mili-
tary commitment. The MSA fails to rec-
ognize the right to conscientiously object 
to military service — a right derived 
from the freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion protected under Article 18 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Instead of provid-
ing proportionate and non-punitive alterna-
tive service options as recommended by 
the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (Commission) (now replaced by the 
Human Rights Council), South Korea reg-
ularly imprisons conscientious objectors 
— a practice that infringes upon the right 
to conscientiously object, thereby violating 
the country’s international obligations as a 
State Party to the ICCPR.
Jong-geon, who aspires to join the legal 
field, passed the South Korean judicial 
examination in 2008, making him eligible 
to become a judge, prosecutor, attorney, 
or military judicial officer. In order to 
complete this process, Jong-geon is obli-
gated by the MSA to fulfill the manda-
tory military service. By refusing to do 
so, Jong-geon faces a five-year bar from 
becoming a judge, prosecutor, or attorney 
in addition to the eighteen-month jail sen-
tence. Conscientious objectors in South 
Korea often face other consequences, such 
as loss of licenses and business permits, 
prohibition from jobs in any state agency, 
and social stigmatization. As of February, 
2011, 955 men were serving prison sen-
tences for conscientious objection — a 
fraction of the 15,000 men who have served 
time for the crime over the last fifty years. 
Jong-geon’s situation is representative of 
the larger problem in South Korea, both 
for Jehovah’s Witnesses who see military 
service as inconsistent with their religion, 
and for others who conscientiously object 
to military service, because by imprisoning 
these individuals, South Korea is failing to 
protect the right to conscientiously object.
While the right to conscientiously 
object to military service is not explicitly 
granted by the ICCPR, the Commission 
has repeatedly recognized it as implicit in 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion outlined in Article 18 of the 
ICCPR. In 1987, the Commission adopted 
Resolution 1987/46, which recognized that 
conscientious objection “derives from prin-
ciples and reasons of conscience, including 
profound convictions, arising from reli-
gions, ethical, moral or similar motives.” 
The Commission went a step further in 
1989 when it recognized conscientious 
objection as a right deriving from the 
rights to freedom of conscience, thought, 
and religion established in Article 18 of 
both the Universal Declaration on Human 
rights and the ICCPR. In so finding, the 
Commission called on States Parties to the 
ICCPR requiring military service to intro-
duce proportionate, non-punitive alterna-
tive service options. While providing alter-
13
Mayer et al.: International Legal Updates
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
55
native service options is not obligatory, it is 
recommended by the Commission as a best 
practice in lieu of measures like imprison-
ment or discrimination.
Late South Korean President Roh Moo-
hyun was sympathetic to the plight of 
conscientious objectors, and in 2007, the 
Ministry of National Defense announced 
that alternative service options for consci-
entious objectors would become available 
in 2009. However, shortly after President 
Lee Myung-bak’s 2008 inauguration, and 
a month prior to implementation, this plan 
was postponed indefinitely and has yet 
to be reintroduced. Affected parties filed 
suit in South Korea’s Constitutional Court 
and await a ruling on the constitutionality 
of the MSA. Regardless of the outcome, 
South Korea’s imprisonment of conscien-
tious objectors and failure to introduce alter-
native service options violates the country’s 
international obligations under the ICCPR. 
china’S continuing cracKdown 
on houSe churcheS infringeS on 
religiouS freedom
Throughout April and May 2011, hun-
dreds of Chinese Protestant Christians 
were detained for attempting to hold open-
air religious services in Beijing. Shouwang 
church pastor Zhang Xiaofeng and con-
gregation members organized the services 
after government pressure resulted in the 
church’s eviction from its meeting place. 
According to the church, this latest eviction 
is one of at least three successful attempts 
by the government to block Shouwang’s 
acquisition of a permanent meeting place. 
China only protects the legal rights of 
religious groups affiliated with state-
registered religions, and Shouwang, with 
around 1,000 members, is one of the larg-
est unregistered house churches in China. 
While the government often turns a blind 
eye to small gatherings of house churches, 
it has been cracking down on Shouwang, 
and house churches like it, by refusing 
to recognize Shouwang legally and by 
interfering with its ability to rent a meet-
ing space. China’s obligations under its 
own Constitution and 2005 Regulations 
on Religious Affairs (RRAs), as well as 
under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), require it to 
protect freedom of religion. Nevertheless, 
government regulations requiring align-
ment with state sanctioned institutions 
infringe upon the religious rights of 
Shouwang church and other similarly situ-
ated religious groups by constructively 
compelling the groups to believe in a 
particular form of Protestantism and by 
discriminating against those who refuse.
China’s obligation to protect the right 
to freedom of religion is found in Article 
36 of the Chinese Constitution, the State 
Administration for Religious Affair’s 
(SARA) RRAs, and Article 18 of the 
ICCPR, to which China is a signatory. The 
Chinese Constitution states that citizens 
“enjoy freedom of religious belief ” and 
that citizens may not be “compel[led] . 
. .  to believe in, or not believe in, any 
religion.” This guarantee is supplemented 
by the RRAs, which were created to 
“ensure freedom . . . of religious belief,” 
but which require religious bodies to reg-
ister with government. The ICCPR’s pro-
visions in Article 18 protecting the free-
dom of religion are similar to those in 
the Chinese Constitution, but include that 
religious freedom “may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.” In a 1993 
general comment, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights empha-
sized that such limitations on the freedom 
of religion must be narrowly construed and 
that “[t]he fact that a religion is recognized 
as a state religion or that it is established as 
official . . . shall not result in any impair-
ment of the enjoyment of any of the rights 
under the Covenant . . . nor in any discrimi-
nation against adherents to other religions 
or non-believers.”
While China considers Protestantism 
one of five recognized religions, only 
two Protestant churches — the Three-
Self Patriotic Movement and the China 
Christian Council — are state-sanctioned. 
Many Christians disagree with the the-
ologies of these state-sanctioned churches, 
opting for the more or less stringent doc-
trines available in unregistered house 
churches. Though SARA allows small 
groups of family and friends to worship in 
homes, larger congregations are expected 
to register with the government, necessar-
ily affiliating themselves with one of the 
two state-sanctioned Protestant churches. 
While China often turns a blind eye 
to smaller unregistered congregations, 
recently, house churches have faced increas-
ing government scrutiny, which many 
believe to be linked to widespread crack-
downs on dissent throughout the country. 
These crackdowns, which coincide with 
revolts in the Middle East, have resulted in 
the arrests of high profile dissidents such 
as artist and activist Al Weiwei. Since the 
Middle Eastern revolts have inspired some 
Chinese citizens to attempt to organize a 
“Jasmine Revolution” within China, many 
observers believe that the government’s 
crackdown on house churches is an attempt 
to curb dissent and maintain control. 
While Shouwang refuses to join a state-
sanctioned church due to ideological differ-
ences, its attempts to register independently 
with the government in 2006 were denied. 
Because the government has failed to 
publicly disclose evidence that Shouwang 
poses a threat to “public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others,” China’s refusal to 
grant Shouwang legal recognition, as well 
as its requirement that churches join state-
controlled congregations, infringes upon 
the right to religious freedom as protected 
by its Constitution, RRAs, and the ICCPR. 
By requiring churches to affiliate with 
particular ideologies in order to gain legal 
recognition, and consequently, legal rights 
such as the ability to secure a place of wor-
ship, China is failing to protect the ability 
of these churches to “adopt a religion or 
belief of [their] choice.” 
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the East Asia for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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